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Alternative Dispute Resolution and Consumer
Protection: An "Odd-Couple" Thriving in the
Offices of State Attorneys General
John W. Cooley*
Alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") and
consumer protection are an "odd-couple." ADR
elicits images of peacemaking while consumer
protection evokes thoughts of rigorous govern-
mental regulation and aggressive law enforce-
ment on behalf of the consuming public. Both
ADR and consumer protection have had a
roller-coaster history of application in the United
States. The emergence of each as a concept with
significant social impact has been cyclical, and,
historically, their respective cycles have been
"out of sync." Only in the last twenty years have
their cycles been merged successfully in the
public's interest. Surprisingly, this has occurred
where one might least expect-in the law en-
forcement activities of the state attorneys gena
eral. This article- will briefly examine 1) the
nature of ADR and consumer protection, 2) the
cyclical history of ADR and consumer protec-
tion and their recent synchronization, and 3) the
operation of ADR programs in consumer pro-
tection divisions of several representative state
attorneys general offices.
(continued on page 2)
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A New Consumer Remedy: Product Recall
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Bruce H. Schoumacher**
Scope of the Problem
One of the principal focuses of the American
tort law system is the two-pronged objective of
discouraging the marketing of unsafe, danger-
ous, or defective products' and, where that is
not accomplished, compensating those injured
by or because of such products.2 Until recently,
the law has devoted little or no effort to getting
products that have proved unsafe, dangerous or
defective out of the homes, schools and play-
grounds of consumers.
For the purposes of this article, it is immaterial
whether the product was (a) defectively de-
signed or manufactured, or (b) considered to be
safe and beneficial to consumers when manu-
factured and distributed, but later determined
to be dangerous.3 Once such products are
placed in the chain of distribution, whether
(continued on page 4)
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these products have a relatively long useful life
in the hands of the consumers, such as an elec-
trical appliance or a car, or whether they have a
short useful life but a relatively long shelf life,
such as sanitary products or canned food, the
traditional discouragement/compensation di-
chotomy is not an effective means of preventing
or reducing loss or injury.
The legal system has responded both judi-
cially and legislatively to the problem of defec-
tive products which have already reached the
distributor or the consumer. While there are a
number of statutes regulating consumer pro-
ducts, the most pervasive is the Consumer Pro-
duct Safety Act of 1972.4
The nature of the response has varied and
grown more prospective or proactive (i.e.,
geared to preventing further or future injuries
rather than merely compensating for past injur-
ies). Early on, courts concluded that when a pro-
duct is inherently dangerous, the manufacturer
or distributor of that product has a duty to warn
consumers of the dangers involved in using the
product at the time of distribution.5 Many of the
early cases involved disputes over the follo-
wing:(a) whether the danger was patent (ther-
eby not requiring a warning) or latent (thereby
requiring warning); 6 (b) whether a warning was
required where the danger was remote or the
possibility of the injury was small; 7 and (c)
whether the warning was adequate,8 especially
in light of the sophistication or lack of sophisti-
cation of the user.9 The duty to warn by label,
instructions, etc., however, is of little value when
the product has already reached the consumer.
Consequently, courts have recently created a
continuing duty to warn of dangers involved in'
the use of a product even after the product is in
the hands of the consumer.10 However, even
here, the courts are split over whether the con-
tinuing duty to warn is limited to circumstances
where the risks associated with the product
were unknown at the time of the design or
manufacture, 1 or whether the duty extends as
far as later discovered data or state of the art
developments.12
Beyond the possibility of a continuing duty to
warn, courts provide no general remedy for
defective products in the hands of consumers. A
leading text flatly states that "[a] manufacturer is
not under a legal duty to recall an allegedly
dangerous product absent a statute requiring
such a recall." '13 In a small number of cases, for
example, O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc.,14
the courts have fashioned novel recall remedies.
In O'Gilvie, the court conditioned a reduction
of the punitive damage award upon the defen-
dant's agreement to a "voluntary" product re-
cal l.'
The Development of Interest in Consumer Pro-
duct Recalls
While the Food and Drug Administration had,
for a period of time, the statutory authority to
recall certain medical devices, the impetus to
expand this remedy on a broad basis occurred in
the courts. In 1970, Consumers Union filed a
complaint in district court to force the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare to com-
pel the recall of several "toys that don't care,"
including lawn darts.16 Although a recall was not
ordered by the court, the attendant publicity
focused attention on the question of whether
product recall was a desirable remedy. Ironically,
the issue of lawn darts is still in the news. The
Consumer Products Safety Commission voted
on October-28, 1988, eighteen years after the
filing of the original suit, to ban the sale of lawn
darts and remove them from stores but not to
require a recall.' 7 The tension between recall
and the prior remedy of mandatory safety warn-
ings is illustrated by an interview of a toy store
manager in connection with the lawn darts ban.
" 'I guess the potential is there for [lawn darts] to
be dangerous,' he said, 'but I think they would
be all right if there were proper warnings and
people used common sense when they were
playing with them.' "18
Partly as a result of the wave of consumerism
in the 1960's and partly as a result of dissatisfac-
tion with piecemeal statutory attempts to cover
specific areas such as flammable fabrics, toys,
poisons, etc., a National Commission on Product
Safety was established in 1967. The Commission
completed its final report on June 30, 1970.19
Legislation based on the report was introduced
in Congress, and on October 27,1972, President
Nixon signed the Consumer Product Safety Act
of 1972 ("the Act").20
The Consumer Product Safety Commission
The Act created and empowered the five
member Consumer Product Safety Commission
("CPSC"), granting it jurisdiction over "consu-
mer products," which are defined as:
... any article, or component part thereof,
produced or distributed (i) for sale to a con-
sumer for use in or around a permanent or
temporary household or residence, a school,
in recreation, or otherwise, or (ii) for the per-
sonal use, consumption or enjoyment of a
consumer in or around a permanent or tem-
porary household or residence, a school, in
recreation, or otherwise.. 21
While the CPSC is empowered under Section 12
of the Act, in the case of an "imminent hazard,"
to proceed to federal court to enjoin the distri-
bution of a product,22 this remedy is not poten-
tially as far reaching as the recall guidelines
which may be issued by the CPSC pursuant to
Section 15 of the same Act, entitled "Notifica-
tion and Repair, Replacement, or Refund." 23
Over one hundred products are subject to "cor-
rective actions" or recalls under Section 15 of
the Act each year.24
Two experts noted that "Congress offered
scant guidance as to what constitutes a defect
under Section 15 and no court has interpreted its
meaning." 25 However, the CPSC has by inter-
pretative rule codified its view of the recall pro-
vision.26 The CPSC's interpretative rule, dis-
cussed in more detail below, notes that defects
that can cause "death or grievous bodily injury
(e.g., mutilation, amputation/ dismemberment,
disfigurement, loss of important bodily func-
tions, debilitating internal disorders, severe
burns, severe electric shocks, and injuries likely
to require extended hospitalization)" must be
reported and, even absent such risk, "other
information may indicate a reportable defect. 27
The rule also gives a number of examples of
what the CPSC considers reportable defects.28
Besides jurisdiction over "consumer products"
under the Act, the CPSC administers the Federal
Hazardous Substance Act,29 the Poison Preven-
tion Packaging Act,30 the Flammable Fabrics
Act,31 and the Refrigerator Safety Act.32 The
CPSC, however, does not have jurisdiction over
tobacco products, motor vehicles, motor vehi-
cle equipment, boats, pesticides, fire arms and
ammunition, aircraft and related parts, and
drugs, medical devices, and cosmetics. jurisdic-
tion over those products rests with other federal
agencies.
The Directorate for Compliance and Adminis-
trative Litigation, one of the CPSC's six directo-
rates, is responsible for investigating potentially
hazardous consumer products. The Directorate
is informed of potentially defective consumer
products by consumer complaints, or reports
submitted to it by manufacturers or sellers
under CPSC regulations. In order to encourage
consumer complaints, the CPSC has established
both a toll-free telephone hotline (1-800-638-
2772) and a toll-free teletypewriter hotline for
the hearing impaired (1-800-638-8270) (in Mary-
land 1-800-638-8104). The CPSC may also initiate
investigations of consumer products without
receiving a consumer complaint.
If the CPSC determines that a consumer pro-
duct contains a "substantial product hazard,"
the CPSC may order the manufacturer or seller
to warn the public of the hazardous conditions.
In addition, the CPSC may order the manufac-
turer or seller to recall any such defective pro-
duct and repair or replace those which are
returned. The recall remedy, as noted earlier,
was a major change away from traditional tort
law. Although prior to the formation of the CPSC
some manufacturers voluntarily recalled defec-
tive products, this was the exception rather than
the rule. Under traditional tort law, the general
rule was to provide compensation for past
injury. By contrast, recalls are geared towards
preventing future injury.
The Recall Process
In order for the CPSC to order warnings or
recalls, it must first determine that the product
contains a "substantial product hazard." 33 Sec-
tion 15(a) of the Act defines a substantial pro-
duct hazard as:
(1) a failure to comply with an applicable con-
sumer product safety rule which creates a
substantial risk of injury to the public, or (2) a
product defect which (because of the pattern
of defect, the number of defective products
distributed in commerce, the severity of the
risk, or otherwise) creates a substantial risk of
injury to the public.
The second definition has been the source of
most CPSC recalls because comparatively few
"product safety rules" have been issued by the
CPSC.
Section 15(b) of the Act requires every manu-
facturer or seller of consumer products to notify
the CPSC of the failure of any product to comply
with a CPSC safety standard. In addition, notifi-
cation of any product which contains a poten-
tially substantial product hazard is required,
unless the manufacturer is certain that the CPSC
has knowledge of the product defect or of the
failure to comply with the standard. The report-
ing requirement under Section 15(b) arises when
the manufacturer or retailer obtains information
that "reasonably supports the conclusion" that a
product defect "could create" a substantial
product hazard. This standard for reporting
reflects a congressional intent to mandate pro-
duct defect reporting in less clear or less com-
pelling situations, and at the earliest moment.
The CPSC guideline for the reporting of pro-
duct hazards34 sets forth the procedures and
timetables for manufacturers, distributors and
retailers to follow, and mandates that the CPSC
be notified.35 It is sometimes difficult for manu-
facturers, distributors, and retailers to deter-
mine whether a defect exists, or whether it
could create a substantial product hazard, be-
cause not all product defects necessarily have
safety risks, and some may have only minor
(continued on page 6)
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safety risks. Thus, manufacturers and sellers
must exercise critical judgment in determining
whether to report a defect to the CPSC.
Experienced practitioners who represent man-
ufacturers or sellers rarely rely solely on the
judgment of the manufacturer or seller to deter-
mine whether the defect may be a substantial
product hazard. Rather, practitioners frequently
encourage their clients to retain an independ-
ent consultant to advise them in making a
determination whether the product creates a
substantial hazard. An impartial consultant also
may be necessary to prevent obvious client bias,
and likewise may protect against a hasty deter-
mination that the product is in fact hazardous
and thus reportable.
The initial determination by the manufacturer
or seller of whether a substantial product hazard
exists (especially if a negative conclusion is
reached) should be well documented by the
manufacturer or seller in the event the CPSC
later seeks civil or criminal penalties based on a
failure to report. High level management, as
well as corporate and outside legal counsel,
should be involved in the decision because of
the potential legal and market-place conse-
quences of not reporting (should it later be
determined that a report should have been
made) or of reporting (when it was not required).
Once the decision to report has been made,
the product defect should be reported by the
manufacturer or seller to the Product Defect
Correction Division of the CPSC. The CPSC pol-
icy guideline indicates that the report of the
defect should be made immediately, but report-
ing firms are allowed ten days to conduct a
"reasonable, expeditious investigation in order
to evaluate the reportability of a death or grie-
vous bodily injury or other information." 3' I
The CPSC guideline indicates that the CPSC
may seek redress for the failure to comply with
the ten-day period for reporting set forth in the
guideline. As a practical matter, the CPSC does
not sanction companies which take longer than
ten days to conduct an investigation and make a
report to the CPSC where the delay can be
shown to be reasonably necessary. Apparently,
the CPSC is reluctant to discourage manufactur-
ers and sellers from reporting potential product
defects by enforcing the deadline too strictly.
If the manufacturer or seller, after consulting
its lawyer, concludes that there is (a) a failure to
comply with the safety rule, or (b) a defect in the
product may be a substantial product hazard,
the manufacturer must report the results of its
investigation to the CPSC within twenty-four
hours,37 by telephone or in writing. If by tele-
phone, the notification must be followed by a
written report within forty-eight hours.38The
initial report should identify and describe the
product, provide the name and address of the
reporting party, describe the nature and extent
of the possible defect or failure to comply with
the applicable safety standard, describe the
nature and extent of the injury or risk of injury,
furnish the name and address of the informant,
and report other detailed information readily
available.
Following the initial report, the reporting
company must submit a full report in com-
pliance with the policy guidelines. The time to
file the full report usually is set forth in a letter
from the CPSC staff to the company after the
initial report is received. It is a good practice to
inform the CPSC in the initial report of the pro-jected time necessary to prepare and file the full
report. Obviously, if the full report cannot be
filed by the dates established by the CPSC, the
company should request additional time to
submit it. At a minimum, the full report should
include the following:
1. The date when the information of the
potential defect or noncompliance with the
safety standard was received.
2. The total number of products involved.
3. The dates when the products were manu-
factured, imported, distributed, and/or sold
at retail.
4. The number of products in the possession
of various parties, such as the number held by
wholesalers, retailers, and consumers.
5. A description of the changes that will be
made in the design or manufacture of the
product, if necessary, to remedy the potential
defect.
6. A description of the information given or to
be given to consumers of the details for the
proposed refund, replacement, and/or repair.
7. A description of the marketing and distri-
bution channels of the manufacturer.
The above discussion concerned situations in
which the initial report of a possible safety
defect came from the manufacturer or retailer,
because this is the largest and most important
source of reports. Potential hazards also come to
the CPSC's attention by way of agency inspec-
tions, complaints from consumers, and reports
from competing manufacturers. In such cases,
the CPSC assigns a compliance officer to investi-
gate the suspect product. After investigation
and consultation with CPSC epidemiologists
and engineers, the compliance officer may con-
clude that a substantial hazard exists. If so, he
will contact the manufacturer or retailer by let-
ter or visit the site in order to gather the neces-
sary information.
If the data reveal a substantial hazard, the
officer will recommend action to the Director of
the Division of Corrective Actions. Upon the
Director's concurrence, a "case opening letter"
is sent with a procedure, comparable in result to
that described for substantial hazard reports by
manufacturers or retailers.39 If the matter cannot
be settled, a formal adjudicative proceeding is
begun and an involuntary recall may be ordered.
The CPSC may obtain a recall either voluntar-
ily from the manufacturer or seller, pursuant to a
consent order under Section 15 of the Act, or
under a formal proceeding authorized by the
Act. Fortunately for the CPSC and for consu-
mers, most recalls are voluntary. Therefore, the
remaining discussion will center on voluntary
recalls.
Reaching the Consumer
Once a seller agrees to a voluntary recall, the
seller must submit a corrective action plan to the
CPSC for review and approval.40 This plan sets
forth the manner in which consumers will be
warned and how the products will be recalled
for repair or replacement. Specific details must
be given as to the language and distribution of
the warnings, and the recall and repair or
replacement procedures.
In practice, warnings can take several forms.
Frequently, manufacturers provide warranty reg-
istration cards or other registration cards for
consumer products, especially the more expen-
sive appliances. Those cards can be used by the
manufacturer to trace product owners. How-
ever, not all purchasers return registration cards
to the manufacturer; many manufacturers do
not even distribute such cards with their pro-
ducts. Accordingly, reaching unregistered con-
sumers can be difficult.
Manufacturers, sellers and the CPSC have
developed various alternatives to reach unregis-
tered consumers. First, display materials may be
furnished by manufacturers to retailers. For
example, the retailers may be requested to place
a poster furnishing the details of the recall at
cash registers. Frequently, letters are sent to dis-
tributors and retailers with materials which the
sellers are requested to make available to pro-
duct users.
The CPSC often requires the issuance of a
press release on the recall. This press release is
issued by the CPSC and is distributed to the
media, which generally reprints or broadcasts its
contents. The manufacturer or seller should
attempt to be involved in the drafting of the
press release. Surprisingly, press releases have
been effective, even where as few as 400 indi-
vidual consumer products are involved. Unfor-
tunately, however, CPSC press releases do not
reach every product user.
As a supplemental method of reaching con-
sumers in recall campaigns, manufacturers often
establish a toll-free telephone number. Thus,
consumers may contact the manufacturer to
verify whether a product is being recalled and
also learn more about the details of the cam-
paign.
The major problem continually facing sellers
and the CPSC is reaching unregistered consu-
mers. Accordingly, in some situations the CPSC
has attempted to have manufacturers or sellers
agree to go beyond registration cards, display
materials, and press releases, and has attempted
to persuade sellers to undertake paid advertis-
ing campaigns to reach the unknown consu-
mers. Although sellers are reluctant to agree to
such advertising because of the costs and the
potential negative market impact, nevertheless,
there have been several voluntary recall adver-
tising campaigns. Because there is no clear
authority for requiring an advertising campaign,
the CPSC is more responsive to the manufactur-
er's request for a role in shaping the form and
language of the advertisements.
As indicated above, other federal agencies
have jurisdiction over specific consumer pro-
ducts. The National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration enforces the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act, which requires manu-
facturers who discover safety defects in auto-
mobiles to remedy the defects at no cost to the
consumer.41 The Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") may order the recall of certain medical
devices and other products under the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act.42 Manufacturers have
agreed to these recalls despite the fact that the
FDA lacks specific statutory authorization for
such orders. Under the National Mobile Home
Construction and Safety Standards Act, the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development
may order mobile home manufacturers to notify
the purchasers of defects.43 The U.S. Coast
Guard, pursuant to the Federal Boat Safety Act,
may order the repair of certain boats that do not
comply with specific safety standards or are
otherwise defective.44 The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency is responsible for recalls of
vehicles or engines not meeting emission stan-
dards. 45
(continued on page 8)
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Conclusion
A safety-motivated product recall is, indisput-
ably, a more effective method of reducing injur-
ies from products already in the hands of con-
sumers than the traditional tort compensation
system. Whatever the relative cost-effectiveness
of other alternatives may be, the product recall
is still preferable. insofar as the recall is effective,
it eliminates the need to compensate for injuries
from product defects which develop after the
sale or distribution of the product.
There are, however, serious questions about
the overall effectiveness of product recall. First,
how effective are warnings,46 whether in the
form of warning labels, operating instructions or
CPSC-required corrective action plans (which
can be warnings as well as recalls)? Second,
while recalls of automobiles47 and major appli-
ances, for which there is usually a purchaser
registration for warranty purposes, are generally
successful, recall results for other products are
often very low. As one commentator observed,
"[i]t is interesting to note that, for a product
which is entirely in the hands of consumers, with
no lag between distribution and the recall, no
notice, no home repair, and which is not a
'sports' product, the [recall] success rate is only
7%, so that low rates of return for products
should not be surprising."4 Moreover, the risks
of a needless recall include: a reluctance to
report borderline substantial hazards, damage
to the reputation of the product, the manufac-
turer, and the retailer, and the possibility that the
fact of a recall may be admitted into evidence in
injury cases in spite of the general exclusionary
rule set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 407.49
Perhaps the existence of recall authority under
the Consumer Product Safety Act and other fed-
eral statutes will encourage courts to follow the
example set by the court in International Play-
tex,50 supra. Conditioning the reduction of a
punitive damage award upon a defendant's
agreement to a product recall would go a long
way toward removing defective products from
the marketplace. Such a condition would also
allow punitive damage awards in product liabil-
ity cases to play the role originally anticipated
for them by the courts.
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Arbitration, mediation, and conciliation are
the principal ADR processes. These processes
are sometimes used in conjunction with fact-
finding (commonly used in labor negotiation
and mediation), a neutral expert, or both. Com-
binations of these processes include Med-Arb (a
combination of mediation and arbitration), the
mini-trial (akin to arbitration), and the summary
jury trial (a condensed trial before a jury whose
verdict is advisory). In the state attorneys general
offices, the ADR processes are tailored to meet
the specific needs of each office.
Consumer Protection Defined
One commentator has defined consumer pro-
tection, or "consumerism," as:
an effort to put the buyer on an equal footing
with the seller. Consumers want to know what
they're buying. What they're eating. How
long a product will last. What it will do and
will not do. Whether it will be safe for them
and/or the environment.... Consumers do
not want to be manipulated, hornswoggled
or lied to. They want truth, not just in lending,
labeling and packaging, but in everything in
the whole, vast, bewildering marketplace.5
This definition suggests consumers need protec-
tion from sellers who deliberately, through acts
of commission or omission, defraud or injure
them. Focusing on the precise interest to be
protected, the same author points to the follow-
ing testimony presented to Congress in 1969 by a
representative of the Consumers' Union of the
United States:
The consumer interest is not the interest of
individuals as such, but of all citizens viewed
from the point of view of consumption.... [It
concerns] itself with the question of both the
best use of productive resources from the
point of view of consumers and also the mat-
ter of distribution of these resources.... It
should be considered at the highest levels of
government, not only to increase consump-
tion, but also to forcefully contribute to creat-
inga better economic structure and thuscon-
tribute to the creation of a better society....
The consumer interest cuts across the entire
spectrum of economic problems.6
Thus, consumer protection is generally con-
cerned with the fundamental nature of the
seller-consumer relationship, and strikes at the
very heart of our economy. Since ADR is primar-
ily concerned with the resolution or manage-
ment of conflicts, its application to consumer
protection in recent years is not surprising. But
the reason ADR was not applied to consumer
protection until about the last third of this cen-
tury is not completely clear. In order to better
understand this current "marriage" of move-
ments, particularly in the public sector, and to
predict the potential for future co-existence,
one needs to examine their history and the
social, economic, and political factors which
precluded their earlier association.
Early Applications of Alternative Dispute
Resolution in the U.S.
As an identifiable concept, ADR is much older
than consumer protection. ADR can be traced
to ancient Greek culture, or before.7 The use of
ADR as a process outside the formal legal sys-
tem, spread throughout Europe over succeed-
ing centuries and surfaced in -America during
the early colonial period.8
On the basis of religious beliefs, Pilgrims,
Quakers, and Mormons all separated themselves
from external legal regulation.9 Disagreements
which arose in these close-knit religious com-
munities were invariably settled through various
forms of mediation. As one commentator has
noted:
... [iinsular religious colonies which avoided
the legal system had two motives. The com-
munities sought, first, to regulate conduct
based on Christian principles and, second, to
establish and preserve community harmony.
Litigation was antithetical to both of these
goals; it represented self-aggrandizement at
the expense of group security, ignoring impor-
tant religious tenets. Those who were unwill-
ing to accept these restrictions could not be
tolerated, and were expelled from the com-
munity.10
Nineteenth century communities attempted
to follow their seventeenth century predeces-
sors and adopt non-court methods of resolving
disputes.11 In the early nineteenth century, Penn-
sylvania, New York, Massachusetts, and South
Carolina experimented with arbitration as an
alternative to litigation. But these experiments
were short-lived. A skeptical judiciary and a dis-
satisfied, competitive mercantile community
caused non-legal forms of dispute settlement to
virtually disappear.1 2 By the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, the once widespread use of ADR processes
in religious, community, and mercantile settings
had substantially abated. Social change had dil-
uted community insularity; religious and immi-
grant minorities were being acculturated into
mainstream society. 3 Immigrants became more
inclined to turn to the courts to seek justice,
though some ethnic communities clung to their
culture-dictated methods of dispute resolution.
(continued on page 10)
